

may reflect a fairly thorough overhaul and reorganization, calling upon, among others, the members of existing families of seers to staff that office thereafter.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> I note—but will not pursue the matter—that the names Kydas and Klyt(i)os carry more or less the same message. I am grateful to Peter Hansen for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.

# PINDAR, *PYTHIAN* 2.56

τὸ πλουτεῖν δὲ σὺν τύχαι πότμου σοφίας ἄριστον.

The sentence has been much discussed,<sup>1</sup> but most of the explanations suggested may be discounted on grounds of word order<sup>2</sup> or Greek usage,<sup>3</sup> and it is fairly clear that the meaning of Pindar's words is that to be wealthy σὺν τύχαι πότμου is 'the best (part) of wisdom'.<sup>4</sup> It remains only to determine the force of τὸ πλουτεῖν . . . σὺν τύχαι πότμου. Eduard Fraenkel<sup>5</sup> and others who take these words together have supposed that the phrase means 'wealth when it is granted by divine will and not gained unjustly',<sup>6</sup> but good fortune is not plausibly said to be a constituent of

<sup>1</sup> A survey in C. Carey, *A Commentary on Five Odes of Pindar* (New York, 1981), 43–5. Recent discussions, with further bibliography: G. W. Most, *AFLS* 7 (1986), 47–71; Pascale Hummel, *La Syntaxe de Pindare* (Louvain and Paris, 1993), 111–14; E. Cingano in B. Gentili et al., *Pindaro, Le Pitiche* (Milan, 1995), 387f.; D. I. Iakov, *Hellenica* 47 (1997), 152f.

<sup>2</sup> I include the explanation τὸ εὐπορεῖν σοφίας [~ τὸ πλουτεῖν . . . σοφίας] σὺν εὐτυχίᾳ ἄριστόν ἐστι, proposed at sch. 101f, ii.48.16f. Dr., and that attributed to Aristarchus, εὐπομπότατός ἐστιν [~ πότμου . . . ἄριστον] ὁ πλουτῶν καὶ σοφίας ἅμα τυγχάνων [~ σὺν τύχαι . . . σοφίας] (ibid., ii.49.6f.).

<sup>3</sup> This may be said of the view that the subject of the sentence is τὸ πλουτεῖν . . . σὺν τύχαι πότμου σοφίας, apparently implied by sch. 101e, ii.48.15f., τὸ δὲ ἐπιτυγχάνειν . . . πλούτου μετὰ σοφίας ἄριστόν ἐστιν: σὺν τύχαι πότμου is shown by *O.* 8.67 τύχαι . . . δαίμονος, *P.* 8.53 τύχαι θεῶν, *N.* 4.7 σὺν Χαρίτων τύχαι, 5.48 Μενάνδρου σὺν τύχαι, 6.24 σὺν θεοῦ . . . τύχαι, to be a phrase complete in itself (so Carey [n. 1], 43f.), and even if it were granted that the words σὺν τύχαι πότμου σοφίας could be joined and understood in the required sense, there would remain the objection that σοφία is a permanent quality, not something that a man gets from time to time, as τύχαι would appear to imply.

<sup>4</sup> The sense of this phrase is settled by Soph. *Ant.* 1347f. πολλῶν τὸ φρονεῖν εὐδαιμονίας / πρῶτον ὑπάρχει and Pl. *R.* 3.389de σωφροσύνης δὲ ὡς πλήθει οὐ τὰ τοιάδε μέγιστα, ἀρχόντων μὲν ὑπηκόους εἶναι, αὐτοὺς δὲ ἄρχοντας τῶν περὶ πότους καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ περὶ ἐδωδὰς ἡδονῶν; compared by Carey (n. 1), 44: it does not mean, for example, 'the best thing wisdom has to offer' (H. Lloyd-Jones, *JHS* 93 [1973], 122 = *Greek Epic, Lyric, and Tragedy: The Academic Papers of Sir Hugh Lloyd-Jones* [Oxford, 1990], 130) or 'bester Gegenstand der Dichtung' (E. Thummer, *RhM* 115 [1972], 298, n. 20, referring vaguely to 'verwandte Ausdrücke wie z. B. τὰ τῆς φιλοσοφίας'; A. M. Miller, *TAPhA* 111 [1981], 142, strangely cites in support of Thummer's view *N.* 10.46 and Thuc. 1.142.9, the latter with a false reference). Most (n. 1), 52, n. 19, appears to suppose that the possibility of this construction is somehow called into question by the existence of the separate construction illustrated at Kühner–Gerth i.279f.; he denies the relevance of the Plato passage on the grounds that 'the superlative is supported by a demonstrative pronoun which it modifies', without explaining why the agreement of μέγιστα with τὰ τοιάδε is to be regarded as essentially different from that of πρῶτον with τὸ φρονεῖν or that of ἄριστον with τὸ πλουτεῖν.

<sup>5</sup> Ap. W. Schadewaldt, *Der Aufbau des Pindarischen Epinikion*, *SKGG* 5.3 (Halle, 1928), 331 [73], n. 0.

<sup>6</sup> So Lloyd-Jones (n. 4); cf. Carey (n. 1), 44.

wisdom.<sup>7</sup> Comparison with *P.* 3.103f., εἰ δὲ νόωι τις ἔχει θνατῶν ἀλαθείας ὁδόν [~ σοφίας ἄριστον], χρηὴ πρὸς μακάρων / τυγχάνοντ' [~ σὺν τύχαι πότμου] εὖ πασχόμεν [~ πλουτεῖν], suggests rather that the sentence is to be understood as meaning 'to be wealthy as and when fortune grants it [i.e. to accept such wealth as fortune brings] is the best (part) of wisdom': Pindar returns to this thought at 93–6, φέρειν δ' ἐλαφρῶς ἐπαυχένιον λαβόντα ζυγόν / ἀρήγει· ποτὶ κέντρον δέ τοι / λακτιζέμεν τελέθει / ὀλισθηρὸς οἶμος. It is God who is in control of men's fortunes (49–52), and Pindar must not have recourse to slander if others are more successful than he (52f.).<sup>8</sup> for he has seen Archilochus in his helplessness taking pleasure in insults, but the best of wisdom is to accept wealth as and when fortune grants it (54–6). To Hieron it has been granted more than to any other man (57–61).

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<sup>7</sup> Cf. J. Péron, *REG* 87 (1974), 8.

<sup>8</sup> For the use of the first person, cf., in the parallel passage in *P.* 3, lines 107–11: σμικρὸς ἐν σμικροῖς, μέγας ἐν μεγάλοις / ἔσσομαι, τὸν δ' ἀμφέποντ' αἰεὶ φρασίν / δαίμον' ἀσκήσω κατ' ἐμὴν θεραπεύων μαχανάν. / εἰ δέ μοι πλούτον θεὸς ἄβρὸν ὀρέξαι, / ἐλπίδ' ἔχω κλέος εὐρέσθαι κεν ὑψηλὸν πρόσω.

## HOMERIC IPHIGENEIA

The *I.T.* opens with Iphigeneia's narration of her dream and her interpretation of it. The dream signifies, she believes, that her dear brother is dead (42–60, 144–56). Shortly thereafter she hears that two new Greek victims are being brought to her and she notes how the recent 'news' of her brother's death has changed her personality (344–79).

To the best of my knowledge, it has never been noticed that the latter speech is clearly and substantially influenced by a passage in the *Iliad*.

When Achilles learns of the death of his dear friend Patroclus, he returns with fury to the battlefield. The hapless Lycaon crosses his path and begs for mercy (21.64–96). Achilles responds (99–113) with a speech that is the source of Iphigeneia's. He notes that before Patroclus' death he had been merciful to and sparing of the Trojans. But now that Patroclus is dead, no enemy who meets him on the battlefield will escape death. Similarly Iphigeneia: previously she had felt mercy toward strangers who fell into her hands, but now that Orestes is 'dead', the strangers will receive no mercy from her (344–50). Thus, the central theme of Iphigeneia's speech is borrowed from Homer.

In addition, there are perhaps tangential similarities. The herdsman observes that the death of captured Greeks serves as vengeance for Iphigeneia on the Greeks who sought to kill her (336–9) and she herself echoes the notion of punishing surrogates in the absence of the real villains (357–8). So Achilles had seen his killing of Trojans, especially sons of Priam, as revenge for the blood of Patroclus, in the (temporary) absence of Hector (105; cf. 95–6).<sup>1</sup>

There are a few verbal echoes: Iphigeneia begins with *πρὶν μὲν*, followed by *νῦν δέ* (344, 348); so too Achilles (100, 103).<sup>2</sup> Addressing herself, she refers to her Greek

<sup>1</sup> We note too that, whereas Iphigeneia recalls her evil father who brought her to her present plight (360), Achilles thinks of his noble father (109). Iphigeneia contrasts her mother to her father (365–8); Achilles mentions his mother as an appropriate complement to his father (109).

<sup>2</sup> This is, in fact, one of only two instances in Euripides of *πρὶν μὲν* followed by *νῦν δέ*. The other is at *Or.* 1095–6.